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A Sophist on Omniscience, Polymathy,
and Omnicompetence : A- A- 8.1—13^
THOMAS M. ROBINSON
(
I ) <TGi S' avrGi > avhpos kuI tccs auras' T€)(vas vofii^u) Kara Ppcc)(v re hvvaadai
hiaXiyeadai, kuI <Tav> dXddeiav twv irpayixdrajv inlaTaaOai, Kai hiKaaaaOai
opdcos, Kai Safxayopeiv olov t' Tj/ixev, Kai Xoycjv T^xvas eTTiaTaaOai, Kai irepl cpvaios
Tojv ccTTavTajv ojs re exei kuI cos eyev€ro,8cS<xaK€v. (2) Kai irpcLrov fi€v 6 7T€pi(pvai,os
riov aTrdvrojv elhcos ttcos ov Swaaelrai vepi TvavTotv opdojs Kai Trpdaaev; (3) en
Se d rds rexvas rcbv \6ywv et8d)s eTnaraaetrai Kai rrepi iravrajv opOwg Xdyev.
(4) Set yap rov (xeWovra 6p6a>s Xeyetv irepi <Lv eirlararai irepi rovrojv Xeyev.
<iTepi> Trdvrojv y dp' emaraaelraf (5) Trdvrcov fiev yap ra>v X6ya)v rds rexvas
irriararai, roi 8e Xoyoi -ndvres vepi rrdvrcjv rGiV e<6vTOiV €vri>. (6) Set Se
eiriaraadai rov [xeXXovra opdcos Xeyev Trepi orojv Kai Ae'yoif < > Kai rd fiev
dyadd opdcos BiSdoKev rrjv ttoXiv irpdaaev, rd 8e KaKd rcos KcoXveiv. (7) elScos 84
ye ravra el8iqaei Kai rd drepa rovrcov Trdvra ydp eTnaraaelraf eari ydp
ravra rwv Trdvrwv, r7]va 8e irori rcovrov rd Beovra irape^erai, al XPV' (^)
Kav [M-q eTnardrat, avXev, di Svvaaeirai avXev, at Ka 8er) rovro npdaaev. (9) rov
Se 8iKdl,eadat, emardpievov 8ei ro 8iKai,ov eTTiaraaOai opdcos' Trepi ydp rovrco rai
SiKtti. el8cos 8e rovro elB-qaei Kai ro virevavriov avrw Kai rd <dXXa avrco?
i>repoia. (lo) 8ei 8e avrov Kai rcos v6fj,cos eTTiaraadai Trdvras' al roiwv rd
TTpdyfxara fxr] eTTiaraaelrai, ov8e rcos vofMOJS. (l l) rov ydp ev pLwaiKa v6p,ov ris
emararai; ooTrep Kai [xcoaiKdv os 8e fir) ficoaiKdv, ouSe rov v6fj,ov. (12) os ya
1 The following authors are referred to by name only: Dupreel = E. Dupreel, Les
Sophistes (1948); Guthrie = W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (1962-); Levi
= A. J. Levi, "On Twofold Statements," AJP 61 (1940) 292-306; Sprague = R. K.
Sprague, tr. of Dissoi Logoi, Mind 77 (1968) 155-167; Taylor = A. E. Taylor, Varia
Socratica (191 1) 92-128; Untersteiner = M. Untersteiner, Sofisti 3 (1954) 148-191.
For a full apparatus criticus the DK^ text should be consulted. The apparatus criticus here
given merely indicates points of divergence from that text (O = "all manuscripts";
Fj = Laurent. 85, 19; F2 = Laurent. 85, 24; Yj = Vatic. 1338; Y2 = Vatic. 217).
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<fiav> Tav aXddeiav tcov TrpayfjLCCTCJV eTriaTaTai, evTrerrjs 6 Xoyos on iravra
eViaraTai. (13) os Be <Kara> ^pccxv <hiaXiyea6ai 8vvaTai>, Set viv ipcoTcofxevov
aTTOKpiveaOai irepl ttuvtiov ovkujv Set viv ttovt* eTriaTaaOai.
(i) <Tai 8' avTa)> scripsi: Ctco avTix)> DK SiKoiaaaOai F1.2 Meibom: Si/ca^ev
imaTaadai DK (2) 6p6a>s Kal Trpdaaev O: opdoJs Kal ^rav ttoXiv 8i,8daK€v>
DK (4) <TT€pl> Rohde ttccvtcuv O: Travr' wv DK y' ap' scripsi: [ydpl DK
(6) /cai Xeyoi <lac. 4-5 lin. > O pr. Kal Xeyei F1.2: /ca Xiy-qu, <Ta
77pay/xaTa>, DK tcu? O pr. Toils' Y1.2 : tods' DK (7) 8e ye scripsi: ye O: [ye]
Diels: Se DK ravra O: TauTCc DK TravTotv, TT^va scripsi: ttocvtcov Tiyva
DK 8e TTOTi O: <o> Se ttotI DK Trape^erai, at ;(;p7j scripsi: rrpd^ei, at ^(^pTj
DK (8) /cav /LtT^ O: Kat /lev DK eTnoTarai scripsi: eTriaTarai O (9) tovtcj
A: TovTO DK <aAAa avTCjl > scripsi: <tovtwv> DK e'repo ta Mullach:
drepa DK (11) ti? O pr. ti? Y2 Stephanus: a»UTOS' DK eVtWaTat; ooTrep
scripsi: iTTiaTarai, oanep DK jxcoaiKav scripsi: ficjaiKccv, DK (13) o? O:
ojs DK <KaTa> Blass: </cat /caTa> DK ^paxv <8iaXeyeadai 8vvaTav>,
Set Blass: ^pcc)(^ <8iaXeyeadat, Bvvarai, at Ka> Se'i^t DK.
Translation
(
I
) I consider it a characteristic of the same man and of the same art to
be able to converse in brief questions and answers, to know the truth of
things, to plead one's cause correctl-y, to be able to speak in public, to
have an understanding of argument-skills, and to teach people about the
nature of everything—both how everything is and how it came into
being. (2) First of all, will not the man who knows about the nature of
everything be able also to act rightly in regard to everything ? (3) Further-
more, the man acquainted with the skills involved in argument will also
know how to speak correctly on every topic. (4) For the man who intends
to speak correctly must speak on the topics of which he has knowledge;
and he will, one must at any rate suppose, have knowledge of everything.
(5) For he has knowledge of all argument-skills, and all arguments are
about everything that is. (6) And the man who intends to speak correctly
on whatever matter he speaks about must know < > and <how to) give
sound advice to the city on the performance ofgood actions and to prevent
them from performing bad ones. (7) In knowing these things he will also
know the things that differ from them, since he will know everything. For
these (objects of knowledge) are part oi all (objects of knowledge), and
the exigency ofthe situation will, ifneed be, provide him with those (other
objects), so as to achieve the same end. (8) Even if he does not know how
to play the flute, he will always prove able to play the flute should the
situation ever call for his doing this. (9) And the man who knows how to
plead his cause must have a correct understanding of what is just; for
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that is what legal cases have to do with. And in knowing this he will
know both that which is the contrary of it, and the (other things ?> differ-
ent in kind <from it?). (10) He must also know all the laws. If, however,
he is going to have no knowledge of the facts, he will have no knowledge
of the laws either. (11) For who is it knows the rules (laws) of music ?
The man acquainted with music. Whereas the man unacquainted with
music is also unacquainted with the rules that govern it. (12) At any rate,
if a man knows the truth of things, the argument follows without dif-
ficulty that he knows everything. ( 1 3) As for the man who is able to con-
verse in brief questions and answers, he must under questioning give
answers on every subject. So he must have knowledge of every subject.
In this eighth chapter of the Ataaot Ao'yot the last vestiges of discussion
in terms of \6yos and counter-Aoyo? have gone; what we have in their
place is what might be called an essay on the characteristics of the para-
digmatic sophist/orator/politician. Its point of contact with most of the
earlier chapters is perhaps its defense of what could be described as
another identity-thesis (see 8.1, <tw S' avTU)> avhpos koI rots avras Te'^va?
ktX.). W:>h the whole chapter one might profitably compare PI. Euthyd.
293-297 (where a similar omniscience-thesis is professed by Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus; cf. Gorg. 458e [?] and Soph. 232b ff. (where the said
omniscience-thesis—among other things—is criticized). In the Sophist in
particular and A.A. 8 (see Dupreel 31 1-3 12) a number of claims about
the sophist's Tiyyr] are couched in fairly similar (though far from identical)
terms: compare, e.g.. Soph. 232d 1-2, A.A. 8.6, 8.9, 8.10; Soph. 232c
8-10, A.A. 8.1 {fin.)\ Soph. 232b 11-12, d2, e3-4, A.A. 8.1 {init.), 8.3
{init.) 8.5 {init.), 8.13 {init.)—on the assumption that Plato's references
to avTiXoyiK-Tj, cuicpia^riTrjais etc. are references to what the sophist of the
A.A. calls TO Kara ^pot-X^ hiaXeyeadai hvvaadai, to to.? twv Xoywv re'^va? elSevat,
etc.; Soph. 234d4 (tcSv Trpayfj-drcuv rrjs dXrjdelas), A.A. 8.1, 8.12; Soph. 232c
4-5, A.A. 8.1 {-rrepl (pvaios tcuv aTravrcuv), 8.2. In view of the affinities, it
seems a fair inference that Plato is (consciously or unconsciously) drawing
upon the A.A. in writing this section of the Sophist; Dupreel (240) makes
the further suggestion, however, that A.A. 8 and 7 {fin.), along with PI.
Polit. 305c-e, themselves have as a common sophistic source Hippias.
But Hippias, so far as is known, never laid claim to omniscience (see
n. ad^.Q. [tt-c/oi Travrtuv]), and he can hardly be singled out among Greek
writers for the belief that 17 ttoAitikt^ was the supreme re'^vij.
Untersteiner {ad 8.13) sees in the "ring-composition" of this chapter
the influence of Hippias. But this view turns on his belief that the Anonymus
lamblichi is also the work of Hippias (see Untersteiner, Rend. 1st. Lomb.
128 Illinois Classical Studies, II
di Sc. e Lett. 77, f.2, 448-449), and this is a view which as far as I know he
is unique in holding. On the whole question of the putative dependence
of A.A. 8 on Hippias see Dupreel 192-200, 240; Untersteiner ad loc, with
litt.
The chapter can be summarized as follows. One and the same rexvr]
gives a particular person
:
(a) the ability to discourse Kara jS/aa^u (see section 13)
(b) knowledge of "the truth of things" (see section 12)
(c) the ability to plead one's cause in court (see sections 9-1 1)
(d) the ability to speak in public (see sections 6-8)
(e) an understanding of argument-skills (see sections 3-5)
(f) a knowledge of the nature of everything (see section 2)
(i) Kara ^paxii]—see Hippias B6 (DK^), PI. Prot. 329b3-4, 334d ff., Gorg.
449b8 ff., Th. 1.64.2; cf. PI. Soph. 24165, Kara a^juKpov. From the evidence
of the first three passages referred to, a natural translation would be
"briefly"; from the evidence of the latter two, "little by little." Perhaps
elements from both are intended : the man under discussion can examine
a topic briefly, and also meticulously, going over each and every aspect
of the problem in patient and systematic detail. aAa^eiav]—books on
"Truth" were written by Protagoras (Bi [DK^]), and Antiphon (Bi
[DK^]). For the phrase tcDv TrpayfxdTOJv rrj? aXrjdeias see PI. Soph. 23404
(cf. Phd. 99e7?), and compare 8.12 below. hiKaaaadai]—"to plead one's
cause." See below, 8.9, SiKoil^eaOai iTnardfjievov. The word refers to private
suits, as a rule, rather than to public prosecutions (see LSJ^, s.v. Si^a^cu,
II i). opdcos]—"correctly," "appropriately"; i.e., in a way conducive to
persuading the jury of the rightness of one's cause. The significance of
(and ambiguities in) the word are felt more and more as the chapter
progresses. On Protagoras' apparent commitment to opOoeireia see PI.
Phdr. 267C6 (= Protagoras A26 (p. 262.5) DK.*^). Trepl (pvaios ktA.]—see
PI. Prot. 337d 3-4 (Hippias speaking), Soph. 232c, oaa (pavepd yrjs re /cat
ovpavov ktX. Tcbv avdvTOJv]—the phrase tojv ccTravTajv suggests a reference
to the world "as a whole," and the subsequent phrases would, if this
interpretation is correct, most naturally refer to the origin and present
state of such a world. Such an interest in the world we can fairly guess
that the sophist Hippias professed and encouraged; cf PI. Hipp. Mai. 285,
Hipp. Min. 3676; Levi, 300-301.
(2) TTcpl TTavTCDv]—"iu regard to everything" (in the distributive sense;
contrast the collective twv ccTravTcvv at 8.1, 8.2). For the use of rrepl see
LSJ9 S.V., A II 5.
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The fallacy is, of course, the fallacy of Division; collective and distribu-
tive propositions are not such that the former necessarily entail the latter.
The move is easily made in Greek, since "all" and "every" are the same
word. Whether Hippias ever claimed such omniscience in practical
matters seems to me in doubt (see below) ; and even if he did, there is no
particular reason for thinking that he would found such a claim on the
fallacy of Division here so neatly exhibited by the author of the A.A.
For Untersteiner, ad loc, in this section of the A.A. "si esprime la corre-
lazione necessaria fra I'universalita di physis, nelle sue molteplici qualita,
e I'universalita del conoscere, cioe la scienza enciclopedica." But omni-
science (here = omnicompetence; cf npaaaev) is neither {pace Unter-
steiner) synonyTnous with encyclopedism nor even a logical corollary of
it. So one must search elsewhere than in Hippias' encyclopedism for
proof that A.A. 8.2 and 8. 12-13 are Hippian in inspiration. One such
source could be PI. Hipp. Min. 363d 1-4, but even here it is not clear
(assuming for the moment—with Untersteiner {Soph. 8 (86) A 8]—that
we are looking at a genuine testimonium) that the clause anoKpivofievov tw
^ovXcfievoj oTt av tis ipojTa is a claim to omniscience; the Kal . . . koL could
be taken to mean simply that Hippias is ready to read (or deliver from
memory?) his set pieces and answer any questions concerning them that
people might care to put—not any questions on any (imaginable) topic.
For Dupreel (199) Socrates has Hippias' claim to omniscience in mind
when at PI. Hipp. Min. 372b he says, "I obviously know nothing"
((palvofiai ouSev etSco?). But this again does not necessarily follow: Socrates'
remark is just as understandable if Hippias proposed encyclopedism, or
for that matter any degree of knowledge.
opdws:]—"rightly," in the sense of "correctly," "fittingly," "appro-
priately." See n. on 8.1 (opOaJs). opOws kuI Trpdaaev. for the idiosyncratic
position of the /cat see 6. 11 €v<pirT]s /cat y€v6p.€vos, and ibid, ean 84 n? kul
(pvais. The textual change proposed by DK (in the light of 8.6) seems
unnecessary'; the purely intellectualist ethics that is apparently being
proposed is no more surprising than that which is frequently attributed to
Socrates.
However, the sequence knowledge—action is made without any attempt
at explanation of the basis for it. Perhaps the author is assuming that
knowledge "how" (to act rightly) is one of tcc arravTa that are known.
(3) Te'xva? Tcuv Xoycov]—"argument-skills" (?). The phrase is a loose
one, and could tolerate a number of interpretations, like "linguistic
skills," "logical skills," "rhetorical skills," "reasoning skills," and the like.
Sprague's "the art of rhetoric" is perhaps a little too restricted, since there
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is no evidence in 8.3-5 ^h^* it is public speaking that is involved. Rather,
8.6-8 seems to deal with such public speaking (Sanayopelv) and 8.9-1
1
with the ability to plead one's cause in court. So I tentatively opt for a
translation which underscores the sophist's dialectical ability in argument
with his peers, be this in the public glare of a Trav-qyvpts or the semi-
public forum of a law-court or the privacy of a home.
opOws Xeyev]—given the ambiguities of the adverb 6pdu)s (see above,
n. on 8.1 [opdws]), the author is able to make his case here because he
has at his disposal a word covering both "nonfallaciously" and "soundly"
and the combination of the two. All that his argument in fact leads to is
a claim that the sophist's reasoning-skills will enable him to produce valid
arguments on every topic—though not necessarily sound ones ; but, given
the ambiguity of 6p6a>s, the argument would perhaps appear to some to
have proved that on every topic a man knowing the rexvas tcDj/ Ao'ycov will
produce arguments that are both valid and sound (i.e., truth-delivering)
—
and it is undoubtedly this latter effect that the sophist is out to produce,
as the subsequent sections make clear.
(4) 7T€pl a>v eirioTaTai]—a defense of the startling phrase irepl ttocvtoov
used in the preceding sentence. Knowledge of the particular subject-
matter involved is, along with understanding of the Te^vai tG)v Ao'ycov, in
any given instance a sine qua non of ro 6pda>s Xeyev (for the ambiguities
of the phrase see n. above). And we know, says the author (see 8.2) that
the aocpiarijs in question has knowledge of everything (see n. on 8.2 [nepl
TrdvTOJv]) . For a clarification of the latter claim see below, 8.7 (with n. on
8.7 [eViCTTao-etrai]), 8.8.
As Taylor sees (124), Set—Aeyev is unexceptionable Socratic doctrine;
Dupreel (194) suggests that 8.4-5 i^ aimed at the rhetoric of Gorgias,
with its stress on form at the expense of content, but this seems to be an
aspect of the rhetorical art that is hardly uniquely Gorgian.
y ap']—see J. D. Denniston, 77?^ Greek Particles (Oxford, 1954) 43. The
reference is back to the statement of 8.2 {fin.) : "and he will, one must at
any rate suppose [y ap'), <as we have seen; see above 8.2 (fin.) ; and see
also 8.5) have knowledge oieverything." But at 8.2 {fin.) all that was claimed
was universal practical knowledge (etScu? . . . Trepi ttolvtiov . . . TTpdaaev)
;
there was no suggestion that omniscience was anything more than omni-
competence.
<7T€pl> TrdvTUiv—eViCTTaaeiTai]—for a similar claim (based upon a series
of arguments purporting to prove that a knowledge of anything implies a
knowledge of everything) see PI. Euthyd. 293b ff. Compare Euthyd. 295b
ff. for the same claim, this time based on the argument that because we
Thomas M. Robinson 131
have a faculty (the «/'ux'^) "^ith which we "know everything we know"
therefore we know everything. At PI. Soph. 233c it is suggested that soph-
ists TTavTa
. . . aocpol tois fiadTjrals (paivovrai because hoKovai Trpos raura
eTTiaTrjfjLovojs ex^Lv vpos airep avriXdyovGiv and hpwoL . . . tovto irpos
amavra (cf Rep. 598c 7 ff.). Whether one can infer from this, however,
that any sophist ever made a serious claim to such omniscience (now, ap-
parently, from the evidence of 8.5, understood in an all-embracing sense)
is doubtful; at best it might have been put forward as a paradoxical
debating point, or as a (pseudo-) synonym for encyclopedism, on the safe
assumption that intelligent observers at any rate (not least other sophists)
would spot (or at least sense) the fallacies in the reasoning. Plato, one
must assume, had such a philosophically educational intention in com-
posing the Euthydemus.
(5) This section is ostensibly a reason (yap) for the final claim of 8.4,
<TT€pl> navTcov—imaraaeiTaL. The first part is simply a repetition of earlier
claims (8.1, 8.3), except that the universality there implicit is now made
explicit; the second part is new. Literally, "All arguments are about every-
thing that is," it could prima facie be interpreted in terms of argument-
form: i.e., there is nothing [ = , one must assume, no event, action, or state
of affairs] that falls outside of the purview of all argument-forms. A more
likely interpretation, however (if the section is to succeed in its ostensible
purpose of explaining the final claim of 8.4, in which TrdvTOiv appears
to be used distributively; cf 8.2 fin.), is in terms of diTgnment-content:
i.e., the sum total of argument-content (actual and possible?) covers the
sum total of what is (actually and potentially?) real/the case. On the first
interpretation the sense of -navTes is clearly distributive ("every argu-
ment"), on the second it is collective ("all arguments"). Either way, one
is now far beyond the omnicompetence claim of 8.2 (Trepi Travrcov . . .
npaaaev)
.
(6) Se]—the topic now under discussion would appear to be, following
the general inverse-sequence of the chapter, hajxayopilv (8.1, fin.), and
the reference to SiSaa/cev rr^v ttoXiv ktX. seems to confirm this.
hel—KwXveiv]—as in previous instances, any /)nma /fl«^ plausibility the
proposition has stems from an exploitation of ambiguities : in this instance
in the use of Set and 6p6d)s. In the case of Sei the natural interpretation
is in terms of duty: "the fxeXXcuv 6p6(x)s Ae'yev has a duty to know . . ."
etc.; the interpretation the author wishes the reader to place upon it,
however, is, "the [xeXXcov 6p9cos Ae'yev cannot help knowing . . ." etc. For the
same ambiguity (and the same intent) see below, 8.9, 8.10. In the case
of opOcos, the first instance exploits the same ambiguities as were found in
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its use at 8.3 and 8.4 (see nn. ad loc.) ; the second is less problematic, and
seems to mean simply "sound," or something similar (compare 8.9 below,
emWaa^ai opdcbs). For a similar stress on to 6p66v see [PI.] Minos 317c.
(7) The sentence is one of the most difficult in the treatise, and emenda-
tion and interpretation is more than usually speculative. Ifmy interpreta-
tion is correct, the author is suggesting that, should a SrjfjL-qyopwv possess
the knowledge requisite to giving the TrdAt? sound advice, he can be sure
that Necessity, the mother of invention (see 8.8, Serj, and on the general
topic Guthrie 2.473), ^^^^ provide him with all other (less important?)
knowledge. The possession of actual knowledge of what it takes to be a
good 8rjij.r)yopa)v is eo ipso the possession o(potential knowledge of everything
else (see 8.8, Swaaelrai). In attempting to make these contentions plaus-
ible, the author appears to confine himself to instances of knowledge
"how" ; at any rate no instances of other forms of knowledge are men-
tioned.
For alternative interpretations, see Untersteiner ad loc, with litt. ravTa]
—i.e., the contents of 8.6 above. imaraaeiTai]—sc. "at least potentially,"
as the rest of the section, and 8.8 below, make clear. The bald claim of
8.4 (Jin.) has been clarified. eWi yap ktX.]—"are part of." See LSJ^ s.v.
elfii, C II. Tcov TrdvTcov]—"all [objects of knowledge]" in the sense of "the
totality of [objects of knowledge]" (see n. on 8.5 above, ^«.). Trjva]—i.e.,
to: €T€pa above (like, e.g., knowledge of flute-playing; see 8.8 below).
TOJVTov]—i.e., the possession of knowledge of everything, toc Se'ovTa]—see
Thuc. 1.22. 1 et alibi; cf. Isocr. 3.25, ovSev tcov Seovrcov TrpdrTovTes. (Unique
to the A.A., however, if my emendation Trape^crai is correct, would be
Ta beovra in the subject-position.) Trape'^eTat]—for irapexeaOai in much the
same sense as Trapex^iv see LSJ^ s.v. Trapexoj, Trapexofiai.
(8) fjLT]]—with all the MSS (from which DK unaccountably diverge
without signalling the fact). eViaTaToci]—Doric subjunctive. The author
is, of course, on the interpretation here suggested, discussing "actual"
knowledge only. Se'?^]—i.e., "whenever the situation calls for doing this";
see above, 8.7, rd Seovra. For the distinction between "actual" and "poten-
tial" knowledge see n. on 8.7, and n. on 8.7 (iTnaTaaeiTai)
.
(9) Set]—see n. on 8.6 (Set) above, to St'/caiov]—simply, "that which
is just." Taylor (126, n. 2), recalling how Plato (Socrates) uses the term
avTcc to: irpdypLaTa at Phaedo 66e 1-2 of the Forms, takes to SiVaiov here and
rd TTpdyfiKTu at 8.IO and 8.12 to refer to the Platonic (Socratic) "objective
reality" that is avTO o euTi BiKaioawrj. But to: TrpdyfiaTa, as I suggest
below, is surely best taken as simply "the facts," and to SUaiov as a hint
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that the proponent of the views of A.A. 8 is in an essentialist tradition.
That he should have adhered to the further, Platonic doctrine of trans-
cendental essentialism seems most unlikely—though the doctrine of the
"presence" of to ijjevSos to a (false) Xoyos (A.A. 4.5) undoubtedly has a
Platonic ring to it. elBijaeL Kai to inrevavTLOv^—-i.e., to aSiKov.
Tce <aAAa avTco? €>Tepola]—for a similar usage see Anc. Med. 9, ttoWo. 8e
Kol aAAa KaKa eTcpoia tcvv dno TrXrjpuiaLos. If this reconstruction is correct
in essence, the author is clearly acquainted with the notion of concept-
clusters; i.e., with the notion that a concept of a particular sort (e.g., to
hiKuiov) can only be said to be completely perspicuous in the context of
a knowledge of its contrary (in this case to ahiKov) and of those related
concepts which, in (actually or apparently) differing from it, shed light
upon it (in the case of to SUaiov such a related concept would perhaps
be rj laovofxia).
(10) Set]—see n. on 8.6 (Set). The required sense here is "cannot
help but." avTOv]—SC. tov SiKoc^eadai. iTTiOTOcfievov (8.9). to: Trpay/LtaraJ
—
"the facts," "what goes on." See below, 8.12, tccv aXdOctav tcov TrpaypidTUJV.
The term is much used by the author, and is of very large extension. See,
e.g., 5.11.
The sense of the section is, apparently, as follows
:
The hiKaleodai i-maTaixevos cannot help but know all the vopiOL.
But knowledge of the laws is itself contingent upon knowledge of to:
TTpdypbaTa.
Ergo the hiKat^eaOai imaTdpievos has knowledge of Ta 7Tpdyp.aTa. In an
earlier argument, the author had glossed his own phrase "the skills in-
volved in argument" (to:? Tex^a? twv \6ywv 8.3) as in fact a reference to
the skills involved in all arguments [i.e., all forms of argument] {ndvTOJv
Tojv Xoycvv Ta? Teyyas 8.5). In the present instance, too, one senses a similar
desire to gloss to: TrpdyiMara (i.e., all the facts relevant to law-making, law-
implementation, etc.) as <7TdvTa> to: npdyfjLaTa (i.e., all facts), so as to lead
to the desired conclusion that certain people can justifiably claim to know
"everything" (8.12). But the cautious ya <pLdv> 0(8.12 indicates perhaps
that he feels that the fallacy would this time be too transparent, and the
move is not in fact made; an ambiguity in the phrase tuv dXdOeiav tu>v
npayixdTcov (8.12) does the job instead. For Taylor (126, n. 2; cf. Levi 301)
Ta TTpdyp.aTa (here and at 8.12) is the equivalent of the Platonic (for
Taylor the Socratic) auTo o cctti SiKaioavvr). See, however, n. on 8.9 above
(to SiKaiov).
(11) vopiov]—the author understandably assumes a close analogy be-
tween law and the "rules" of pt-waiKd, since a single Greek word, vofios,
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covers both. But the v6fj,oi of 8.10 relate to a body of facts (ra TrpdyfxaTa),
while the vofios of 8. 11 relates to a reyvr] (a fMcoaiKo). However, in context
it seems possible that the term (jLojaiKcc refers to the "field of music" as an
object of "acquaintance" knowledge, rather than to skill in playing or
composing [xwaiKa, thus lending the analogy some measure of support.
For a similar use of the term fMovaiK-q see PI. Tht. 206b (93^07701 are the
aroix^ta ixovaiKrjs—a piece of "book" knowledge in no way contingent
upon one's having mastered any instrument).
(12) ya <fxav>]—an indication that in the author's eyes 8.10 and 8.1
1
have in themselves been insufficient to demonstrate the truth of the thesis
of 8.4 (Jin.).
rav ocXddeiav Ttov Trpayixdrajv^—see 8. ID (TrpdyfiaTa) and n. on 8.1
{dXddeiav). The author clearly feels that this is the proposition most
likely to win general acceptance, and one sufficiently strong to "prove"
the thesis of 8.4 {Jin.), even if others are rejected. The reason for his
assumption seems to be his confidence that the average reader will in-
stinctively unpack the phrase twv npayixdrtov in a generic sense—i.e., as
<7rdvTcxjv> Tcov TTpayfxdTcov (see final n. on 8. 10 above). Plato also uses the
phrase (Soph. 234c)—a dira^ in his writings—in what seems to be such an
all-embracing sense, and given the context (a discussion of sophistic
practices) a clear possibility emerges that tcov Trpayixdrajv rj dXrjOeia was a
favorite sophistic catch-phrase (and perhaps even a specifically Prota-
gorean one; see Diog. Laert. 9.51, Eurip. fr. 189 Nauck^), to which an
allusion was in the context not inappropriate. For his more normal
phrasing see Phd. gge (twv ovtojv ttjv dXi^Oeiav), Men. 86b.
(13) <KaTd> ^paxv]—given the apparently inverse structure of the rest
of the chapter, it seems natural to expect at this point a reference back
to 8.1; so I follow Blass and DK in inserting <KaTd>. Set . . . Set]—for
the ambiguity see n. on 8.6 (Set). The first instance involves duty (self-
imposed or otherwise), the second one hypothetical necessity.
If I have understood him correctly, the sophist has constructed a series
of arguments in which it is claimed that there exist certain people who
are, not simply polymaths and encyclopedists (like, say, Hippias), but
also persons endowed with omnicompetence and omniscience. Just why
the (apparently one-sided) arguments are included in a work that at any
rate begins with a set of antithetical Xoyoi (A.A. 1-4) is not immediately
clear,2 but one might suggest that basic and interesting ambiguities (if
2 See, however, W. Kranz, "Vorsokratisches I\': Die sogenannten Aiaaot Adyot,"
Hermes 72 (1937) 226.
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not direct antitheses) are to be found in a number of key words, giving
the chapter a dialectical tension it does not at first sight possess: iras, for
example, can be used collectively or distributively ; Set can be used of
duty or hypothetical necessity; opdays can mean "nonfallaciously" or
"soundly" or both. With such terms at his disposal, the sophist can con-
struct an amazing phantasmagoria of non-sequiturs, an object of bewilder-
ment and perhaps irritation to the uninitiated among his hearers, to
others however probably just another routine (like the Euthydemus?) for
the exercise and toning of philosophical muscles. How much of this was
the conscious purpose of the author we cannot of course know with
certainty. If he was the "talentlose Verfasser" of whom Diels {ad A.A. i.i)
spoke, we can only assume that he was largely if not wholly insensitive
to the ambiguities just mentioned, had as a consequence no such philo-
sophically reputable purpose in mind as the one I have just alluded to,
and almost certainly did not himself profit philosophically from the treatise
he had just composed. While this is possible, it seems to me much more
likely, given the care with which the chapter is composed, that we are
looking at a sophist endowed with skills at least as sharp as those demon-
strated by the sophists in Plato's Euthydemus (where no one believes for a
moment that they were fooled by the ambiguities in their own arguments).
The difference perhaps is that the sophists of the Euthydemus seem to be
merely clever; if they have any honest propaedeutical purpose in mind,
it does not appear from the dialogue (Plato's own purposes are, of course,
something different). The author of the A.A., by contrast, in this chapter
seems to me both clever and serious, and for that reason alone the possi-
bility of a reputable propaedeutic purpose on his part should not, I
think, be discounted.
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